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'''Bridging the Gaps: Better Infrastructure Project Management and Civil Engineering

Practices Based on Lessons from the Second Avenue Subway Project'''

== Abstract==
The importance of thorough geotechnical investigations, effective communication, and adaptability to ensure the completion of complex transit projects on time and under budget cannot be emphasized enough. The Second Avenue Subway (SAS) project in New York City has come under intense scrutiny owing to numerous delays and massive cost overruns. This paper highlights the need for a transformation in civil engineering graduate programs to better equip students and practitioners for the complexities of transit project deliveries. Due to an overemphasis on theoretical computational practices, civil engineers have neglected the development and interpretation of policy knowledge, leading to critical decisions being made by those with limited sustainability understanding. This trend, combined with the ineffective communication of technical aspects, has contributed to escalating costs and misaligned sustainability outcomes in transit projects. Herein, a holistic learning approach that encompasses project management, public policy, and real-world case studies is presented to bridge the current knowledge gap and prepare future professionals for successfully delivering sustainable, on-time, within-budget transit projects.

Herein, the management, engineering, and administrative practices employed in the SAS project are comprehensively analyzed. Key assumptions made by the project management and design teams are highlighted that led to unexpected costs and delays. The role of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) as an administrative agency is examined and gaps in engineering knowledge and practices within the MTA are identified.

The analysis results demonstrate the need to address the financial sustainability of transit projects and obtain a funding equilibrium. In addition, the MTA needs to prioritize hiring and promoting individuals with engineering credentials, increase transparency and accountability, and foster stronger partnerships with external stakeholders.
The lessons learned from the SAS project can be used to inform future infrastructure projects and guide the transformation of the MTA into a more efficient, cost-effective, and responsive organization.

==Practical Applications==

This paper addresses the challenges faced by civil engineering professionals in delivering transit projects on time and within budget. Modern civil engineers must have a diverse set of skills, encompassing engineering, planning, economics, environmental science, management, finance, and law. Additionally, they must understand public policy and sociology while being updated on the challenges of translating public policies into engineering outcomes.
The paper emphasizes the need for meaningful change in civil engineering graduate school programs to include project management, public policy, and professional practices using real-world cases and public projects. This will equip students and practitioners with necessary tools to plan and manage transit projects effectively.
Because of the increased complexity of US public administration since WWII, learning transit fundamentals and problem-solving techniques within the context of delivering sustainable projects by graduate students is urgently required. Additionally, this paper underscores the importance of modifying civil engineering education to better prepare professionals for the challenges and opportunities in the realm of transit project delivery.

==Introduction==

Unlike other engineering disciplines, civil engineering is inextricably intertwined with public projects, which differ dramatically from other engineering products because they do not follow a single pattern or protocol (Harris and McCaffer 2013). Public projects develop in response to particular societal and governmental needs, and thus the broader economic, environmental, and political contexts in which they are embedded must be considered. The successful completion of these projects requires civil engineers who are not just technically competent but also able to understand public policy as well as political, environmental, and sociological concerns (Labuschagne and Brent 2004). Relatedly, civil engineers do not develop or work on products that can be sold to generate revenue but on projects that must secure governmental funding and approval as well as satisfy not only individual users but also public stakeholders (Koppenjan and Enserink 2009).

Kaufman (1956) outlined three distinct phases in the evolution of administrative leadership in the United States to address the core value of representativeness in a democracy. The first phase focused on representativeness in the nascent government with “No taxation without representation” as the principal interest of independence. The second phase was the quest for “neutral competence” that began after the Civil War and continues to this day. The aim was for the government to work based on explicit and objective standards rather than personal, party, or other obligations and loyalties. The slogan “Take administration out of politics” gave rise to the Civil Service Act of 1883, which aimed to control the selection of government workers by establishing a merit-based hiring system and offering formal training to civil servants at universities (Kaufman 1956). Although states and localities were slow to adopt these practices, they have made significant strides in recent years. The third phase focuses on the need for “executive leadership” to bridge the gap between the unresponsiveness of neutral competence and the public’s demand for clear communication. Civil engineers can play a crucial role in this process by negotiating effectively with bureaucratic entities and forming alliances with legislative committees and groups, which will allow them to gain greater autonomy in decision-making if they can establish clear expectations for knowledge and outcomes.

However, civil engineering has not yet established best practices in three areas: public policy, project management, and professional practice. This has posed challenges for individual engineers within powerful organizations to influence policy decisions for the public’s benefit.

In the United States, transit projects have long been a source of frustration for the public because of their high costs and delays. Media headlines have highlighted these issues and have painted a picture of inefficiency and exorbitance in the public sector (Gordon and Schleicher 2015, Rosenthal and Fitzsimmons 2017). Scholars and policy analysts have proposed various explanations for these problems, including the cost of land, regulations, and community opposition (Glaeser and Poterba 2020). However, the evolution of civil engineering, particularly the narrowing of the knowledge base and skill set associated with the profession, may be a significant but overlooked factor. Of course, this narrowing is not a development exclusive to civil engineering alone. Abbott (1986) noted that professions often become more specialized over time, which leads to a reduction in the knowledge and skill set of individuals. However, while such specialization may make sense in other professions, the narrowing of civil engineering has contributed to a failure to fully integrate the technical requirements of transit projects with political, social, environmental, and economic needs. This has resulted in a disconnect between the technical aspects of transit projects, which civil engineers are trained to address, and the non-technical aspects, which they are not. This has led to increased costs and public frustration. Civil engineers can play a significant role in overcoming this disconnect and contributing to the development and execution of successful and sustainable transit projects, but only if their own education and training shifts to (re)emphasizing sustainability. A clearer understanding of how the capacity and role played by civil engineers has changed over time is needed to help address these problems.

The Second Avenue Subway (SAS) project in New York City (NYC) has garnered attention because of design issues, construction challenges, and decisions that led to massive cost overruns. This project faced numerous design challenges including building a new subway line in a densely populated urban area and accounting for varying geological conditions along the route. Ongoing criticism of the SAS project’s cost and delays in completion have resulted in scrutiny of the project management and decision-making processes. In this paper, the SAS project is used as a case study to highlight the need for a more detailed study on engineering alternatives and the establishment of best practices in project management to prevent cost overruns and delays in future projects.

== Civil Engineering Knowledge==
===From 1800 to 1950===
In the early days of civil engineering in the United States, ad hoc public commissions or chartered companies managed public construction projects (Kaufman 1956). With the evolution of the field, civil engineering became known as “land development” (Williams 1922). The primary concern of such commissions was feasibility, which led to the first wave of public projects consisting of canal construction (Poor 1860). The Concord Canal Report (1825) emphasized assessing a project’s economic and technical value before execution, which necessitated consulting experts in mechanics, hydraulics, geology, and soils to estimate the costs, benefits, and results. When debating whether Massachusetts should promote canals or railroads, Governor Levi Lincoln consulted experts in various fields to resolve questions related to labor, expenses, and project benefits and results (Poor 1860).

The Civil War represented a turning point for civil engineering as railroads were constructed to facilitate transportation of Union armies, which laid the groundwork for modern civil engineering. In the post-Civil War era, civil engineers collaborated with investors to finance and build railroads, which significantly contributed to the country’s economic growth (Civil War Railroad Report 1865). Railway engineers needed knowledge in finance and business management because private financiers were the primary investors in railroads while the government granted rights of way. Gotshall (1903) highlighted the importance of these skills by demonstrating the practicability of high-speed electric railways from both engineering and commercial perspectives. In the late 19th century, Thurston argued for a dedicated method of publication to provide engineers with detailed and specific knowledge in their field. He called for an institution devoted to providing individuals with technical training and practical laboratory experience (Durand 1929), which aligned with the trend for various fields at the time of specialization in knowledge and skills. The emergence of professional societies such as the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) facilitated this trend by providing a platform for knowledge exchange and expertise. Thurston’s vision and the emergence of professional societies laid the foundation for the growth and development of civil engineering as a full-fledged profession in the United States. However, this also led to the emergence of new administrative challenges and changes that significantly affected its ability to expand its intellectual dominance among engineering disciplines (Durand 1929).

At the beginning of the 20th century, civil engineering encompassed a combination of factual, conceptual, and procedural knowledge. Unlike law and medicine, engineering schools were founded by college-trained professors who designed the curricula. Although the apprenticeship method was used to train engineers, it never developed into significant engineering schools. Teaching theory before practice led to many first- and second-year students feeling disoriented and disheartened because they continued to engage in the same routine of reading books and studying abstract symbols as they did in high school (Durand 1929). This disconnection between academia and engineering practice became evident during the construction of massive projects that required unprecedented coordination, planning, and management. Parsons (1902), who was the Chief Engineer of the NYC Rapid Transit Commission at the time, warned that the engineer of the future would need to deal not only with calculations but also with human needs, industrial demand, finance, and legislation. Engineers would need to combine technical and economic expertise to conceive, plan, design, execute, and manage projects.

===From 1950 to the Present===
The post-World War II era brought several challenges to civil engineering, including the bankruptcy of the railroad industry, massive administrative changes, and the widening gap between academia and professional practice. The United States underwent a major administrative shift by transitioning from ad hoc decision-making when funding transit projects to a more structured and centralized system emphasizing executive leadership, efficiency, and data-driven decisions (Barzelay 2001). This approach influenced agencies such as the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), where urban planners began to outnumber civil engineers (Lewis 2004). Despite improvements in transit planning, a disconnect persisted between professionals and politicians, which raised concerns about the effectiveness of decision-making and implementation (Levinson 2003). Urban planning evolved as a profession in response to the challenges of urbanization in the late 19th century (Hall 2002). Initially, city planning focused on the City Beautiful concept. However, as cities expanded, land economics became increasingly important (Filion and Hammond 2003). Lawyers, civil engineers, and urban planners all began playing key roles in shaping American infrastructure (Peterson 2003).

The ASCE did not heed Parsons’ warning from the early 20th century, and they neglected to advance their knowledge in project management, public policy, and professional practice (Fitch 1999). When the transit industry went bankrupt, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, Department of Energy 1970) was published, and the FTA issued several policy documents on funding strategies for transit projects. Civil engineers struggled to add engineering interpretations of these policy documents with regard to recommending best practices and ensuring that new engineers are educated accordingly in universities (Barzelay 2001). In addition, a governmental shift toward a business-oriented approach led to a decline in practical professors and licensed engineers, which caused a loss of influence by civil engineers (Dzur 2008). Meanwhile, organizations such as the Project Management Institute have enabled managers without an engineering background to assume high decision-making positions within governments and engineering firms offering construction management services (Kerzner 2009). Abbott (1986) argued that business-oriented practices are more applicable to professions that lack technical roots and thus prioritize business strategies. However, professions such as civil engineering and medicine derive their legitimacy not just from efficiency and quality management but also from the technical skill and experience inherent to their fields.

Following the Civil Service Act and the rise of neutral competence, civil engineers should have developed a series of management practices tailored to enhance the overall functioning of transit organizations, which would have helped them to effectively manage and maintain the developed infrastructure as well as provide informed engineering interpretations of policy documents such as the NEPA (Perry and Rainey 1988). Unfortunately, civil engineers did not work on developing and interpreting policy knowledge, but rather they became focused on a narrow scope of computational practices in design, which was driven by an excessive theoretical focus in academia (Petroski 2011). This knowledge gap, combined with the lack of participation by civil engineers in interpreting the NEPA, led to major planning decisions being made by planners and economists with a limited understanding of sustainability (Council on Environmental Quality 2014). Consequently, NEPA is now perceived as a permitting tool rather than an engineering document, which has caused public participation to be associated with Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) attitudes and resulted in misaligned sustainability outcomes for transit projects (Kates et al. 2005; Real Estate Record and Builders’ Guide 1868–1884). Urban planners and civil engineers both play critical roles in evaluating transit project options. While urban planners focus on the socioeconomic impacts, civil engineers concentrate on the technical and operational aspects. However, the failure of civil engineers to effectively communicate technical issues to stakeholders has led to the NEPA being regarded as a bureaucratic process, which has caused transit project costs to soar (Petroski 2011).

The inability of civil engineering to adapt to the evolving landscape of public administration and the growing influence of policy documents on engineering practice may have weakened its standing. Furthermore, practitioners are unable to effectively shape their academic foundations, unlike their counterparts in medicine and law (Petroski 2011). This has led to disjointed and ad hoc academic solutions, particularly in graduate programs, which fail to provide civil engineering students with the necessary knowledge and skills to understand a project’s life cycle in the context of project management as well as policy knowledge for funding and executing transit projects on time and within budget (Perry and Rainey 1988).

In an attempt to address these shortcomings, construction management has been introduced as a hybrid program between business and engineering schools (Petroski 2011). Unfortunately, these programs often lack an engineering-focused approach to expanding undergraduate curricula to develop students’ understanding of public policies, project management, and professional practice. Instead, they primarily emphasize the memorization of terminology and the use of ad hoc computational software (Katz 2012). In professional practice, civil engineers have struggled to adapt to changing demands, including new technologies and increased regulations. The profession must reassess its approach and incorporate the necessary skills and knowledge to effectively contribute to the construction of sustainable infrastructure projects (Petroski 2011). The lack of engineering interpretation of public regulations such as the NEPA and the FTA’s Capital Investment Grants Program requirements has significantly affected the planning and execution of infrastructure projects (Council on Environmental Quality 2014). The ASCE has acknowledged the issue of practical experience within the profession, but it has struggled to intervene in graduate education (ASCE 2008). Moreover, the lack of input by civil engineers in interpreting the NEPA has led to major planning decisions being made by planners and economists with a limited understanding of sustainability (Council on Environmental Quality 2014).

To tackle the challenges faced by civil engineers, a holistic approach to project delivery is needed that combines technical expertise, policy understanding, and quality management practices. Although the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) ensures the quality of undergraduate education, graduate programs often lack these three essential components. ABET was established in 1932 as the Engineers’ Council for Professional Development and was initially focused on the technical content taught in courses. In 1997, ABET shifted its emphasis to learning outcomes with the introduction of Engineering Criteria 2000 (EC2000) (ABET 2021). This transition led to a more flexible approach, which is a key quality needed for professionals to succeed in fields of vital importance to society (Kates et al. 2005). By investing in academic knowledge and prioritizing technical expertise over business-oriented practices, civil engineering can restore its value and effectively contribute to the construction of sustainable infrastructure projects in the future (Petroski 2011). Civil engineers must also play an active role in interpreting and complying with important policy documents such as the NEPA to ensure that the intended sustainability outcomes are achieved (Council on Environmental Quality 2014). By doing so, civil engineers can avoid the mistakes of the past and build a better future for our planet. The need for a more comprehensive approach to project delivery and a greater understanding of public policy is essential for the continued growth and success of civil engineering.

==Second Avenue Subway Project==
===Historical Context and the Need for Best Practices===

In this study, we have employed a research methodology centered on the SAS project. We used publicly available data from three main sources. First, we conducted an in-depth analysis of engineering reports and documentation from the SAS project found in the FTA’s oversight monitoring reports, published by its project management oversight contractor (PMOC reports 2013). Second, we examined the MTA’s publicly available quarterly comprehensive reports to stakeholders. Lastly, we reviewed relevant reports and literature on NYC subway construction during 1880–1920. These reports contained Rapid Transit Commission reports and best practices in the transportation infrastructure domain.

The data-analysis component of our methodology included qualitative and quantitative methods. Initially, we reviewed the engineering reports and the PMOC and MTA reports on the SAS project. Furthermore, this examination facilitated the extraction of pertinent data and identification of key themes and patterns concerning project performance, challenges encountered, and lessons learned. We have utilized our professional experience and expertise in the field to offer context and nuance to data analysis. This has allowed for a comprehensive understanding of the project’s complexities and highlighted the significant aspects that may otherwise have been overlooked. Moreover, we have compared the SAS project’s performance, challenges, and outcomes with those documented in the literature on the NYC subway project of 1900. This comparative analysis was aimed to pinpoint any unique aspects of the SAS project and evaluate its overall success in relation to the Rapid Transit Commission’s NYC subway in the early 20th century.

We devised evaluation criteria based on findings from the literature review to estimate the project’s performance. Furthermore, we considered the specific goals and objectives proposed in the SAS draft environmental impact statement (EIS) and final EIS. We employed these criteria to evaluate various dimensions of the SAS project, such as cost, schedule, quality, and stakeholder satisfaction (PMOC reports 2013).

The construction of the NYC subway system in the early 20th century exemplifies the technical and financial expertise required of civil engineers. The system cost approximately 350 million USD to construct in 1920 (New York Times 1920), which is equivalent to 4.48 billion USD in 2018. This is similar to the construction cost of the Panama Canal, which was approximately 375 million USD at the time, and it exceeded the cost of similar systems in all other great cities in the world combined. However, the NYC subway system has since become a vital part of the city’s transit infrastructure and has contributed to its economic growth and development. It serves as a testament to the importance of civil engineering in society (Kirkwood 2012). Although the term “sustainability” was not explicitly used during the planning and design of the NYC subway system, all three pillars of sustainability (i.e., economic viability, environmental protection, and social equity) were integral to its construction (Walker 1917). The importance of effective technical communication can be seen in the annual reports of the Rapid Transit Commission. Notably, the challenges faced by the commission at the time were not that different from those faced in the 21st century, such as the population density of Manhattan, subway routes, funding issues, concerns of the public, and tunnel depth (Hood 2004). Documents from the early 20th century (Gotshall 1903, Walker 1917) describe the cost and economic viability of the NYC subway system considering construction challenges and an 1896 court order while also highlighting the social, environmental, and economic impacts.

For new transit systems, the ASCE assesses how well they align with current engineering best practices and requirements. The ASCE Report Card offers insights into the necessary expenditures to maintain transit systems, but its primary objective is to ensure compliance with contemporary standards (Glaeser and Poterba 2020). This assessment can be influenced by subjective factors such as the performance of the responsible organization. It is crucial to understand that a poor evaluation does not always imply a poorly functioning subway system because the ASCE does not distinguish between management and engineering. In other words, a system could be well-engineered but poorly managed. Most subway systems were built in the 1940s, and since then agencies originally responsible for their construction have transitioned to their operation. Thus, such agencies have lacked involvement in engineering projects to build new subways for nearly six decades.

In the existing legal framework, project management contracts are neither considered professional service contracts nor backed by surety, and the ASCE has not yet formulated best practices for project management similar to those developed for design and temporary construction, which have clear guidelines and codes to which the design team must adhere. In the absence of clear guidelines, project management teams may not be held accountable for any issues, which can potentially jeopardize their reputation and credibility. To address this lack of knowledge, the ASCE can publish best practices for transit project management, design, and construction with a focus on consistent engineering principles and legal clarity. The ASCE should establish best practices for an acceptable level of performance concerning project management services. These can include constructability review documents, project budgets, contingency plans, and schedules on par with the approximately 70 design standards currently maintained by the organization.

===Design and Construction Decisions===
The SAS project has garnered attention due to its design, construction challenges, and decisions that led to massive cost overruns. The absence of best practices for project management contributed to the project’s setbacks.
The SAS project faced numerous design challenges, including building a new subway line in a densely populated urban area and accounting for varying geological conditions along the route. Table 1 presents the depths of stations for the SAS project. The draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) for the SAS did not discuss the three options of shallow, mid-depth, and deep tunnels to determine the most feasible path forward. The number of ventilation shafts and access shafts required is related to the depth of the tunnel. The Rapid Transit Subway Construction report provided guidelines for balancing the cost, soil type, construction method, and location to determine the optimal depth for subway tunnels (Associated Engineers-A Joint Venture 1975, New York Urban Transportation Group 1972).

During the preliminary engineering phase between 2000 and 2004, the project management team created budget and contingency plans before entering the final design phase. Despite these efforts, the budget at the Record of Decision had grown to 3.68 billion USD, which was an increase of 920 million USD over the original projection from the 1999 DEIS. By the time the SAS project secured federal government funds, the budget had reached 3.90 billion USD, and it eventually increased to 4.45 billion USD by the time of completion. The ongoing criticism of the cost overruns and delays has resulted in scrutiny of the project management and decision-making processes. The publication of the Final Environmental Impact Study (FEIS) in 2004 elaborated solely on different means of constructing a transit system on Second Avenue, which is primarily a planning practice. This highlights the need for a more detailed study of engineering alternatives and a stronger emphasis on establishing best practices in project management to prevent cost overruns and delays in future projects.

===Geotechnical Design and Construction Issues===
===Tunnel-Boring Machine===
The project management team faced several geotechnical design and construction issues. One of the challenges was related to the tunnel-boring machine (TBM). The team initially justified the use of a TBM because of its ability to dig underground without causing surface disruptions. However, they did not properly plan for the removal of soil excavated by the TBM, which led to the contractor having to install large muck removal and caused obstructions and disruptions at the street level. Furthermore, the cost of using the TBM was triple the amount needed for the more traditional method of cut and cover, which raised questions about the effectiveness of constructability review documents and project management practices (Urban Engineers 2012).

== Table 1: SAS Station Depth ==

{| class="wikitable"
|+ SAS Station Depth
|-
! Station !! Location !! Type !! Transfer Routes !! Preliminary Entrance Locations !! Approximate Station Depth
|-
| '''SECOND AVENUE LINE'''
| colspan="5" style="background-color:#dddddd;" |
|-
| 96th St || Second Ave/96th to south of 94th St || 2 track || || Second Ave/southwest corner of 96th St and northeast and southwest corners of 94th St || 40–45 ft
|-
| 86th St || Second Ave/87th to south of 82nd St || 2 track || || Second Ave/northeast and southeast corners of 86th St and eastern side of Second Ave between 83rd and 84th Sts || 85 ft
|-
| 72nd St || Second Ave/72nd to 69th St || 3 track || Bway/Second Ave Lines || Second Ave/northeast and southwest corners of 72nd St; and northeast corner of 69th St || 85 ft
|-
| '''63RD STREET LINE'''
| colspan="5" style="background-color:#dddddd;" |
|-
| Lexington Ave || 63rd Street/Lexington to Third Ave || 4 track || F || Existing: Lexington Ave/63rd St; New: Third Ave/63rd St (northwest, southeast, and possible northeast corners) || 105–135 ft
|}

== Notes ==
# Average depth of Manhattan tunnels constructed in 1900 was 30 feet.
# 72nd Street station became two tracks.
# All four tracks at Lexington Avenue (63rd Street station) exist today; only two are used for passenger services.

===Ground Support Challenges===
The 72nd and 85th Street stations faced constructability challenges related to ground support during the detailed design stage. Engineers discovered that the quality and depth of rock above the stations were not adequate to support the tunnel (Fulcher et al. 2013, Urban Engineers 2008). The original design of the 72nd Street station included three tracks, but it was at such a depth that the design team was forced to change the configuration to the current two tracks. This highlights the need for conducting thorough geotechnical studies and developing engineering alternatives rather than relying solely on a shallow FEIS analysis. This can prevent costly redesigns and reconstructions during the excavation process and ensure that the design aligns with the project’s goals.

===Utility Work and Contracting Challenges===
In the preliminary design phase, the project and design team initially planned to use six construction contracts, but they later encountered problems with utility work and the assumption that general contractors would handle all permits, engineering, and logistics. This resulted in the team having to break the contract into separate utility and station contracts as had been recommended by an engineering report on the construction of the original subway system in 1919 (NYC Engineering Report on Subway Construction). During construction, the project management team discovered that the buried foundations of elevated tracks on Second Avenue that had been demolished in the mid-1940s still existed, which presented a significant cleaning task. This was yet another instance where the project deviated from the best engineering practices in terms of a thorough geotechnical investigation prior to detailed design and risk management (Urban Engineers 2010).
===Real Estate Acquisition Challenges===
The design and project management team assumed that the acquisition of real estate for shaftways would be straightforward. However, accessing the ground beneath the surface was not without issue (Real Estate Record and Builders' Guide 1904). The team assumed that only one building would be necessary for real estate negotiations. However, in reality, access was needed through multiple interconnected buildings when the design team started the detailed design. Manhattan block buildings leaned on each other, and there was no gap between them (Eschenasy et al. 2017). Thus, an individual building provided support to the entire block. The design team had to construct a frame that supported the entire block to pull it out in one piece (Urban Engineers 2008).
In cases where the access shaft was going into a building, the SAS project needed an easement by law. However, the project needed to enter multiple buildings because the buildings were interconnected. Manhattan’s structures were designed so that someone living two or three buildings away from the access building had to walk through a hallway in the second or third building before arriving at the original access building. A deeded easement was required for this setup (Urban Engineers 2008).

A comprehensive approach to civil engineering best practices in project management is essential for understanding the intricacies of large-scale transit projects such as the SAS. Relying solely on individual perspectives and interpretations is insufficient for a profession that has built subway systems since the late 19th century. Successful projects necessitate a systemic understanding of project management, which includes thorough geotechnical studies, effective technical communication between stakeholders, and a detailed analysis of real estate acquisition and utility work. In addition, it is crucial to emphasize the importance of translating these efforts into the education of graduate students. They should be taught to understand construction deliverables, project delivery methods, and construction packaging in a practical manner, akin to the hands-on approach expected of law or medical students. This goes beyond mere memorization and equips future professionals with the skills necessary to navigate complex projects effectively. By learning from the experience of the SAS project, future project management teams can address challenges related to tunnel-boring machines, ground support, and utility work while also navigating the complexities of real estate acquisition and easement. Implementing these lessons will help minimize delays and cost overruns, which will ultimately lead to more efficient and cost-effective infrastructure development.

Moreover, it is vital for project management teams to remain adaptable and open to changes in their initial plans. This flexibility will enable them to respond effectively to unexpected challenges that may arise during the design and construction phases. It is equally important to invest time and resources in conducting comprehensive analyses, including geotechnical investigations and engineering alternative analyses, to ensure that projects are built on a solid foundation.

== Table 2: SAS Budget History ==

{| class="wikitable"
|+ SAS Budget History (in Millions)
|-
! Categories !! 1999 DEIS (Phase I & II) !! 1999 DEIS (Adjusted for Phase I) !! FEIS (2004 Record of Decision) !! FFGA (November 2007) !! Actual (2018)
|-
| '''Total Design''' || || || $410.00M || $410.00M || 
|-
| '''Construction Management Services''' || || || $86.00M || $80.94M || 
|-
| '''Construction''' || $4.82B || $2.17B || $2.81B || $2.69B || $2.78B
|-
| Contract 1: Tunneling || || || $375.88M || || 
|-
| Contract 2–6 & Others || || || $2,430.12M || || 
|-
| '''Rolling Stock *''' || $610.10M || $610.10M || $157.00M || $153.00M || ~~$0.00M~~
|-
| '''Real Estate''' || $131.40M || $59.13M || $191.00M || $240.96M || $281.50M
|-
| '''OCIP''' || || || $180.00M || $160.00M || 
|-
| '''Project Reserve''' || || || $8.00M || $173.10M || 
|-
| '''NYCT Labor, Utility Reimbursement, etc.''' || || || || || $145.30M
|-
| '''Subtotal Without Financing''' || $5.56B || $2.76B || $3.68B || $3.90B || $4.45B
|-
| '''Financing Cost''' || || || || || $796.31M
|-
| '''Total''' || || || || || $4.85B
|}

== Notes ==
# All estimates are for the **Year of Expenditure (2018)**.
# SAS Project Phase I **never paid for rolling stock**; therefore, the estimate is crossed out.

==Metropolitan Transportation Authority==
Public authorities acquired many of their transit systems from private companies that were in financial trouble after World War II. Because of the decline in profits and ridership, transit companies spent less money on maintenance and renovation, which resulted in their systems largely falling into disrepair by the time they were acquired by public authorities. The new transit authorities have had limited success in addressing the problem of station neglect, with a lack of funds being a major challenge. The NYC Transit Authority was established in 1953 (Homburger and Kennedy 1961), and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) was created later in 1968 (New York Urban Transportation Group 1972). Since then, the MTA has consistently struggled with budget deficits and has been unable to establish a pricing equilibrium. It is not considered financially sustainable because of its reliance on government subsidies to balance its budget. It also lacks transparency in its financial system, and it is not held to the same standards of competency as private institutions. However, as a public institution, its value in terms of economic growth and employment through infrastructure investment must be recognized (Glaeser and Poterba 2020).

To operate sustainably and be responsive to taxpayers, the MTA needs to establish an equilibrium in funding to cover operating, maintenance, and capital improvement costs while recognizing that it may not conform to a normal pricing equilibrium (Mankiw 2018). It is crucial for project stakeholders to have confidence in the MTA’s management, whether practices are internal or external (Mayor's Committee on Management Survey 1953). The MTA has two primary roles in managing its transit projects: planning and economics, and engineering. To be competent in these practices, the MTA staff must possess the necessary knowledge and skills. Several reasons justify subsidizing public mass transit systems with taxes. First, taxation is the only practical way to collect from people who indirectly benefit from the transit system. Without taxes, the community would receive a benefit without contributing in return. Second, fares paid by riders do not fully cover the operating costs, depreciation, and capital asset investments. Therefore, it is necessary to collect part of the cost from both riders and the community through taxes (Litman 2021). Opponents may argue that fares should be high enough to cover the total costs of the transit system to eliminate the need for government subsidies (Coase 1960). This approach would discourage some people from using the system’s services and result in fewer riders. Subsidies help the MTA maintain affordable fares and allow the NYC transit system to operate at its intended capacity, as it has for over 100 years (Habib et al. 1978).

Notably, NYC’s transit system has always been subsidized, dating back to the first streets and docks built at public expense in 1684 and city-operated ferries crossing the East River. Even private investors were not allowed to increase fares to the level of pricing equilibrium. Transit facilities are generally more economical when heavily used, as reduced traffic leads to wasted capacity (Parry and Small 2009).

To achieve a funding equilibrium, the MTA must make an effort to itemize its costs and develop a plan to control them effectively. The complexity of its budget can be understood by examining three main categories: operating costs, maintenance costs, and capital investments in expanding the system (Engineering-Contracting 1910). Therefore, the MTA is responsible for managing taxpayer money in a way that balances its budget while also investing in capital growth to deliver sustainable transit projects. However, the MTA has struggled with effectively managing construction projects due to a lack of advancement in civil engineering practices and knowledge.

Theoretically, the MTA maintains a high level of accountability, but this is not consistently evident in its organizational practices (Hood 1992). As a result, while a design team may generate technical documents, the project management team of a consulting firm will not review them because it falls outside the scope of an engineering contract. In essence, the project management team satisfies the MTA’s staffing needs without requiring members to hold necessary engineering qualifications, understand engineering practices, or carry engineering liability insurance. Despite this, the MTA is the highest authority in the decision-making process and integrates the three variables of scope, cost, and schedule for capital projects. Most of the members of a project management team will not possess the necessary credentials to review engineering practices or deliverables because being a licensed engineer is not a key requirement. Rather, a certification in management is needed. This is a significant departure from reports from the early 20th century (Building the New Rapid Transit System of NYC 1915), which emphasized that the design and construction of the NYC subway system was primarily an engineering task with military-like organizational principles.

It is vital for the MTA to address this gap and prioritize engineering knowledge and practices in its project management. Currently, the project management team may move in one direction, the design team produce construction documents in another direction, and the construction team move in yet another direction independent of the other two. This lack of coordination can be seen in the SAS project, where the geotechnical design team produced design memos for the tunnels and stations that were signed off by the project management team and construction team. However, the construction documents did not consider the shallow depth of rock on top of the tunnels or the width of the tunnels in their original three-track design, which caused problems in the construction of the stations. The schedule and budget approved by the project management team confirmed that it reviewed the design, but no changes were made, which is likely because the FTA would not pay for a project redesign.

To overcome these challenges and improve overall performance, the MTA must make significant changes in its organizational structure and management practices. One critical step is to require project management staff to possess engineering credentials and knowledge. By doing so, the MTA can better align its various teams and ensure that they are working collaboratively toward a common goal. Furthermore, the MTA should invest in the professional development of its staff by providing ongoing training and resources related to civil engineering practices. This will help it keep up with advancements in the field and ensure that its projects are executed using the most up-to-date techniques and methods.

Another essential component of improving management practices is to increase transparency and accountability within the MTA. By implementing performance metrics and regularly tracking progress, it can ensure that it is effectively managing taxpayer money and delivering results in line with its objectives. Increased transparency can help build public trust and demonstrate that the MTA is committed to providing quality service while responsibly managing its resources. Finally, the MTA should focus on forging stronger partnerships with external stakeholders such as local governments, businesses, and community organizations.
Conclusion

The early 20th century witnessed the evolution of civil engineering into an established profession with a comprehensive knowledge base. Civil engineers contributed to the construction of massive projects such as the NYC subway system, which required technical and economic expertise. However, civil engineering faces vulnerabilities because of the absence of a well-rounded education system that can prepare engineering students for the complexities of future projects and the disconnect between academia and engineering practices. As civil engineering knowledge continues to develop, the profession must address these vulnerabilities and adapt to the changing demands of the industry.

The SAS project faced multiple design challenges and construction decisions that resulted in considerable cost overruns. The assumptions made by the project management and design teams regarding geotechnical issues, construction contract packaging, real estate acquisition, and easement were unable to handle the complexity of the SAS project. This resulted in unexpected costs and delays, as evidenced by the significant budget increases. To avoid similar issues, it is crucial to examine the logic and lessons learned from the project and apply these insights to future endeavors. The lack of well-defined best practices for project management played a role in these issues. To avoid similar problems in future transit projects, the ASCE should establish comprehensive best practices for project management, design, and construction encompassing consistent engineering principles, legal clarity, and acceptable performance levels for interpretation under the NEPA. By adopting these best practices, transit agencies and engineering firms can collaborate more effectively to complete crucial infrastructure projects on schedule and within budget. The SAS project serves as a case study for the importance of thorough planning, effective communication, and adaptability in the face of complex challenges. The lessons learned from this project can be applied to the better planning, design, and execution of future infrastructure projects, which will ultimately benefit both the industry and the public.

The MTA is a vital public institution responsible for providing essential transit services to NYC citizens. However, it faces significant challenges related to financial sustainability and management practices. By prioritizing engineering knowledge and practices, increasing transparency and accountability, and fostering stronger partnerships with external stakeholders, the MTA can transform itself into a more efficient, cost-effective, and responsive organization. These changes will ultimately lead to better transit services for the public and a more sustainable future. As the MTA evolves and adapts to these new management practices, it can serve as a model for other public institutions looking to improve their own operations and better serve their constituents.

==Data Availability Statement==

All data used in this study is publicly accessible and can be obtained through the provided references. For the PMOC reports, readers can access the FTA’s website at https://www.transit.dot.gov/foia/metropolitan-transportation-authority-second-avenue-subway. The 2013 “The Politics of Large Infrastructure Investment Decision-Making: The Case of the Second Avenue Subway Case Study” report can be found at https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/27119.

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